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Abstract 
Media coverage of elections in Europe and North America has increasingly 
focused on the campaign as a game rather than a policy debate. This is often 
explained by the changes in media pressures. It may also reflect the narrowing of 
policy space between left and right and the comparative prosperity enjoyed in 
Europe and North America. But the relevance of politics varies. The global 
economic crisis might have led to an increased interest in policy among voters 
and focus on it by media. Ireland experienced both extremes of boom and crisis 
between the late 1990s and 2011. The Irish case allows us to test the impact of 
the crisis on media framing of elections. This article uses original data from the 
three most recent national elections in Ireland, with a research design that holds 
other pertinent variables constant. We find empirical support for the theoretical 
expectation that the context of the election affects the relative focus on campaign 
or horserace versus substantive policy issues. 
 
Paper accepted at European Political Science Review 
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Introduction 
In the last few days of the 2012 US Presidential election 20 per cent of traffic to 
the New York Times website went to Nate Silver’s blog analysing opinion polls 
(Tracy 2012). For some this was a trivialisation of an important decision that the 
nation was making (Gerson 2012). It reflected a mania for measurement that 
ignored the substance of the election. Poll analysis is usually thought of as 
treating an election or politics as a game or sport and is discussed in the same 
way. In this article we ask why do newspapers cover elections the way they do, 
and in particular what causes an emphasis on polls or electoral strategy as 
opposed to substantive policy? 
 
It is a question that goes to the heart of democratic theory. Amartya Sen (1999) 
made the connection between the debates a country conducts and its social 
outcomes. He argues that democratic policy debate prevents famine and other 
disasters. Sen is not alone. Keane (1993) sees that a good quality public service 
media and a variety of media outlets are essential to the proper functioning of 
democracy.  
 
If the media are covering the ‘wrong’ aspects of electoral campaigns then it might 
have a negative impact on the functioning of democracy. Cappella and Jamieson 
(1997) found that the media fuel public cynicism in politics through the way they 
cover politics, a position supported by other observers (Fallows 1997; Downie Jr. 
and Kaiser 2002; Patterson 1994). Cappella and Jamieson (1997) specify the type 
of coverage they worry about as game-framed coverage; that is, coverage that 
frames political debate as a game played between politicians and not one in 
which important policy issues are debated. They argue that the media’s focus on 
the ‘game’ of politics to the detriment of the substance of policy issues is at the 
root of voter cynicism and disengagement. This result is not conclusive as de 
Vreese and Semetko (2002) found that while framing in terms of strategy did 
increase cynicism, it did not affect turnout. 
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If this is a problem, it might also be one that is getting steadily worse. One of the 
main arguments for why the media have moved towards covering politics as a 
game is due to commercial pressures (Patterson 2000). Competition between the 
press and broadcast media could have caused a shift to focus on campaign events 
and stories at the expense of substantive policy issues. According to Iyengar and 
McGrady (2007: 62), writing about the US, ‘no matter what the medium, the 
public affairs content of the news has been diluted’. More recent changes, 
including the advent of free sheets (newspapers usually handed out at transport 
hubs in urban areas) and free access to internet news sources, see newspapers 
competing for fewer paying readers. The 24-hour news-cycle increases the 
pressure on news outlets to produce copy, reducing the time journalists have to 
make considered judgements on policy issues (Conboy 2011: 99).  
 
In this article we accept that any move towards game-oriented coverage of 
election campaigns is in part due to commercial pressures and changes in 
medium, especially as the internet changes how, and how quickly, news can be 
gathered and disseminated; but other factors, unrelated to media structure, will 
also be important. The social, economic and political context in which an election 
takes place must surely matter. We specifically argue that when an election 
takes place at a time of crisis – that is, when there is an unexpected negative 
change in some aspect of the state’s affairs, which causes a debate on the failure 
and how the state might react – the media revert to more issue or policy-based 
coverage. The post-2008 economic crisis in Europe offers an opportunity to test 
this thesis. Using original data we study the case of Ireland, which from 2008 
suffered a particularly severe economic shock that ultimately saw the country 
enter an external support programme in November 2010 backed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
European Union (EU). The external intervention caused the fall of a government 
and early elections. We study how the print media covered that 2011 ‘crisis’ 
election and look at how it compares with other recent elections held against a 
buoyant economic backdrop. We find that the press focus is related to how 
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important policy is to voters and to the sense of crisis in the country. The concept 
of ‘crisis’ elections and that elections vary in importance is also useful. This 
allows us to examine other variables, such as economic growth, or war, that can 
explain variation in the media approach to politics.  
 
In the following sections we discuss how we might explain variation in media 
coverage of elections. We consider a number of independent variables that might 
be influential and we evaluate them in the Irish case. Looking at the context of 
Irish elections between 1997 and 2011 we then set out our research design, in 
which we can hold all but one of these variables constant. After discussing the 
data collection we present our findings and conclude with a discussion. 
 
 
Explaining variation in election coverage 
There are many ways of measuring how elections are covered in campaigns. One 
is to look at the amount of coverage elections are given as a percentage of total 
space (McMenamin et al. 2013). Another is to look at the ratio of soft news to 
hard news, however defined (Scott and Gobetz 1992). A third way is to look at 
the relative attention to episodic (stories) compared to thematic (general) frames 
(Iyengar 1991). Possibly the most commonly-used is to look at policy-focussed 
news and that which relates to the game of politics (Cappella and Jamieson 
1997; see also Aalberg, Strömbäck, and de Vreese 2012 for a comprehensive 
review of literature on strategy and game frames in political coverage). For 
instance, the debate in the US on ‘Obamacare’ could be approached in two ways: 
the media could cover the substance of the debate on health policy or they could 
discuss the strategic game of how likely it is that the policy will become law. If 
indeed framing is the appropriate term, this is an example of ‘emphasis framing’ 
(Chong and Druckman 2007).1 Strömbäck and van Aelst (2010: 48) understand 
‘the game’ to refer to the ‘strategy of political campaigning,…the horserace and 
battle for voters,…the images of politicians…political power as a goal in and of 
itself, or…politicians and persons rather than as spokespersons for certain 
policies.’ More recently scholars have distinguished between the game frame 
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(which focuses on polls and who will win) and the strategy frame (which focuses 
and the motives and tactics of parties and candidates) (Aalberg, Strömbäck, and 
de Vreese 2012).  
 
Modern election coverage is both a political and a media phenomenon. Therefore, 
it is expected that variation in election coverage is a function of both media and 
political variables. We discuss a range of such variables, not in order to provide 
definitive tests of their importance, but rather to demonstrate that omitted 
variable bias is a minor concern in our study of Ireland.  The first media factor is 
commercial pressure. Scholars argue that the increasing commercialisation of 
the media explains the increasing focus on the game (Strömbäck and van Aelst 
2010). Media outlets should find it easier to generate advertising revenue and 
attract audience share/ readers by covering politics as a game; an exciting 
contest, akin to sport, with winners and losers, rather than policy debates, filled 
with jargon, statistics, and caveats. The greater the pressure to generate profits, 
the more likely the media is to cover politics as a game. In electoral contexts the 
game frame might treat elections as a ‘horse race’, where the audience is 
interested in who is winning, losing or, who has fallen at a hurdle (a political 
scandal), rather than looking at the substantive issues at stake in the campaign. 
Elections are especially easy to cover as a game because there is an eventual 
winner. They are analogous to sports events– some electoral contests are 
foregone conclusions and so less interesting whereas some are competitive and 
hence exciting affairs. Media outlets can drive this coverage by encouraging or 
commissioning certain campaign events. Some campaign events, such as leader 
debates or opinion polls, facilitate commercially-driven media to game-frame 
election coverage. So we should see that when leader debates are introduced, 
game-framing of election coverage increases.  
 
An alternative hypothesis might be that media fragmentation means that those 
who had no interest in politics could easily avoid news coverage. This could allow 
newspapers to become more policy driven as they could target specific types of 
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readers who shared a policy outlook, and remain commercially competitive. We 
will deal with this possibility empirically below. 
 
The second media factor is professional norms. In some media systems and 
outlets professionalism is defined in terms of an absence of partisan bias (for 
instance, the BBC), while in others professionals are less inclined to separate 
fact from opinion and give the need for balanced debate a lower priority (Fox 
News). In reporting substantive policy debates journalists might find it more 
difficult to remove their own values, and their analysis almost inevitably 
involves some judgement on the desirability of the policies in question (Cushion 
2012). Where a norm exists against partisanship we are most likely to see 
elections portrayed as a game, as this makes it easier to avoid the appearance of 
favouring one side over another (Hallin 1994: 25). Those who strive to avoid 
accusations of bias might concentrate instead on the likelihood of the policy 
being passed. The decline of political parallelism where  newspapers were linked 
to specific parties and the acceptance of professional norms of objectivity can 
explain the increasingly game-oriented framing of elections. 
 
Though they should have substantial effects on election news coverage, political 
variables appear to be somewhat less prominent in the literature. First, the basic 
institutional structure makes a difference to the nature of elections and should 
therefore influence how the media portray them (Binderkrantz and Green-
Pedersen 2009). In consensual political systems, many actors, partisan, 
institutional, and civil society, have an important role in policy-making. By 
contrast, in majoritarian democracies decisions tend to be centralised in an 
executive controlled by one party. In consensual countries, elections rarely lead 
to a clear turnover in power. Indeed, it is often policy-oriented coalition 
negotiations, rather than elections, that bring about shifts in power. On the 
other hand, in majoritarian systems, elections can transfer power to a totally 
different set of actors. Therefore, election coverage in majoritarian elections is 
likely to be much more game-oriented as elections usually have clear winners 
and losers. Lawrence (2000) hypothesises a related explanation based on the 
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decision-making capacities of different political institutions. She finds in her case 
study of US welfare reform in the mid-1990s that the game frame should be 
more likely where there is policy conflict with a clear ‘winner’.  
 
The available evidence strongly favours this hypothesis. The case-study 
literature clearly identifies majoritarian institutions with the game frame.  
Dimitrova and Kostadinova (2013) make a big step forward in leveraging two 
decades of political change in Bulgaria to show that two indicators of 
majoritarianism, the number of parties and the electoral system, can explain 
variations in newspaper framing of elections. Unfortunately, in most countries 
such basic variables vary little over time. Nonetheless, it is possible to undertake 
a preliminary cross-national test. Kaid and Strömbäck (2008: 424) summarise 
existing research on election coverage in 22 countries. While acknowledging 
differences in the source case studies, they identify the type of coverage as game, 
policy, or mixed for 17 of the 22 countries covered. Of these in only one (the 
Netherlands) are substantive issues dominant and then in just two more (Japan 
and Sweden) do we see issues dominate coverage in the press, but not in the 
broadcast media (see Table 1).2  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Using empirical work that classifies regimes as predominantly consensual or 
majoritarian (Lijphart 1999: 248; McMenamin 2004: 269) we can see if there is a 
systematic difference according to political decision-making structures.3 Coding 
game as zero, mixed as one, and policy as two, we can perform an ordinal logit to 
estimate coverage framing using a dummy variable for majoritarianism as the 
predictor. As Table 2 shows, the coefficient is in the right direction and 
significant at five percent, in spite of the small number of observations.  We 
classified Bulgaria, South Africa, Brazil and Mexico qualitatively according to 
the criteria of Lijphart’s first dimension. If these are excluded the 
majoritarianism coefficient still explains much of the variation in framing and is 
significant at ten percent.      
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Table 2 about here 
 
A second political variable is more prominent in the literature. It is often argued 
that a narrowing of the terms of political competition has pushed election 
coverage towards the game-frame (Strömbäck and van Aelst 2010; Binderkrantz 
and Green-Pedersen 2009). The narrower are the ideological and policy 
differences between parties, the more the game frame dominates. Many argue 
that there has been a shift towards valence competition in recent decades 
(Clarke et al. 2004). Parties and voters agree on the ends of politics. Parties 
compete only in terms of the likelihood of achieving these ends (Stokes 1963; 
Green 2007). This is usually interpreted as resulting in a focus on the 
characteristics of leaders and politicians, rather than policy choice.  
 
A third political variable is the competiveness of a specific election. A competitive 
election is more exciting and easier to characterise in game terms, so we would 
expect that close elections or those with uncertain outcomes will have more 
game-oriented coverage. To date the literature offers speculation rather than 
analysis on this question (Strömbäck and Aalberg 2008), perhaps because 
measuring closeness across countries is not always straightforward. While in 
countries with plurality electoral systems and two-party systems we can 
measure it as the difference between the top two parties, in proportional 
representation systems competiveness is not so easily quantified. The parties’ 
support may not appear balanced on a knife edge, but the possible coalition 
outcomes might.  
 
Our final political variable is the type of election. Reif and Schmitt (1980), noting 
different voting behaviour in elections to the European Parliament compared to 
national elections, conceived the first-order and second-order election models. 
First and second-order elections are usually distinguished in terms of the 
importance of the office being elected. Where the election is important, that is to 
the primary policy-making institutions, voters are thought to concentrate on the 
intrinsic choice at stake in the election. In second-order elections voters are less 
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concerned by the formal focus of the election but instead use it to, perhaps, 
express dissatisfaction with the government or signal to the government the 
wish to move in a certain policy direction. Second-order elections tend to have 
lower turnout while smaller parties do well and government parties do worse 
than we would otherwise expect.  
 
In distinguishing electoral contests in this way elections to the same office in the 
same country, e.g. elections to the US Presidency or UK general elections, are 
essentially invariable. While politicians almost invariably talk of ‘this’ election as 
one where a vital choice must be made, even within a country, elections to the 
same office vary in importance over time. An election at a time of crisis should 
matter more because the disorder caused by the crisis necessitates vital 
decisions. This contrasts with elections during periods of contentment where 
politicians might compete on who is best able to maintain and manage the status 
quo. It has been found that elections are better conceived on a continuum 
between first and second order (van der Eijk et al., Franklin, and Marsh 1996) 
and in the real world there is certainly no dichotomy between crisis or 
contentment. The level of a crisis or failure – when there are unexpected 
negative changes to the political, economic or social affairs of a state bringing 
uncertainty – will vary. When there is a great sense of crisis or system failure we 
expect that the election will be treated in a qualitatively different way by 
competing parties and the voters they aim to convince. The election will be about 
more that just the choice between the parties; it will be about policy choices. 
Certain policy issues are nearly always important, for instance the economy, but 
only at times are these issues regarded as important problems (see Wlezien 2005 
for a discussion). When issues can be conceived of as problems facing society and 
when those problems are great, then we should see a greater policy focus by 
politicians and policy interest from the general public. As well as demand from 
the public driving a greater policy focus, which we regard as the main causal 
mechanism, parties may have less money to spend on marketing and so may 
have to rely on policy for attention. Similarly newspapers may have less money 
to spend on opinion polls. 
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We also have expectations about media coverage where there are these greater 
levels of uncertainty and disorder. The electorate will expect that the media 
reflect this debate in their electoral coverage to a greater extent than in a 
contentment election. This is consistent with Zaller’s (2003) idea of a ‘burglar 
alarm standard of news quality’ in which he proposes that modern mass media 
cannot and need not be expected to provide high quality coverage of all relevant 
political events on a routine basis. Instead, he argues that soft-news coverage 
which emphasizes drama, the game and strategy frame, is appropriate for the 
coverage of ‘non-emergency but important events’ while the ‘burglar alarm’ will 
be rung and citizens be alerted ‘to matters requiring urgent attention’ (2003: 
122). The concept of a crisis election constitutes a special case of this burglar 
alarm notion.  We propose that, in a crisis, media coverage will shift from game 
and strategy frames that the media utilize to generate attention to a routine 
process to emergency coverage that refocuses on the political issue underlying 
the crisis. 
 
Thus we hypothesise4 that: 
 
Everything else being equal media frames of elections will become more 
policy-focussed during periods of unexpected negative change in economic, 
political or social affairs. 
 
The context of the 2011 Irish general election  
Elections to Dáil Éireann – the Irish parliament – in 2002, 2007 and 2011 
represented interesting contrasts, though these contests were to fill the same 
offices and broadly the same parties contested. The 2002 and 2007 elections can 
be regarded as unusually contented elections, whereas in 2011 the country was 
dealing with the repercussions of a severe economic shock.  The election in 2011 
was called before the parliamentary term had finished as the incumbent 
government’s majority ended due to Ireland’s entry into an external funded 
programme. The election was the third most volatile in terms of changes in party 
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support in post-war European history and the most volatile in which no new 
party emerged (Mair 2011). 
 
Up to 2008 Ireland had enjoyed the epithet ‘Celtic Tiger’ as its economy had 
grown at remarkable rates from 1997 to 2007. Unemployment had fallen to close 
to four per cent; employment had doubled; and Ireland, traditionally a country of 
emigration, saw its population rise through a combination of high immigration 
and high fertility rates. Initial growth was caused by a significant inward-
investment boom and a strengthening of the domestic economy but after 2002 
the there was an unsustainable property boom. Irish banks fed the property 
bubble through lax lending funded by cheap credit available on international 
markets. The very weak regulation of those banks became apparent in late 2007 
as the implications of the international ‘credit crunch’ impacted on the Irish 
financial sector. The situation came to a head in September 2008 when the Irish 
banks could not access money on the financial markets, and their loan-books 
were increasingly troubled as more loans defaulted. The Irish government 
guaranteed the debt of all Irish banks as it believed that they were solvent but 
suffering from a short-term liquidity problem. In fact, the banks were insolvent 
and the €70bn bank rescue was the result of what was, given the size of the 
country, the biggest banking failure in world financial history. 
 
At the same time Irish tax revenues fell dramatically. Irish governments had 
increased state spending in the previous decade, and were now under pressure to 
reduce this quickly. A number of emergency budgets followed that reduced 
government spending, but the deficit remained stubbornly high at about ten per 
cent of GDP. Between 2008 and 2011 real GNP declined by 11.9 percent. General 
government debt increased from 25 percent of GDP in 2007 to 107 percent of 
GDP in 2011. The unemployment rate averaged 4.5 percent. This increased 
substantially, estimated at 14.4 percent in 2011. Although Ireland had seen 
recessions before, particularly in the 1980s, none had seen as sharp a drop in 
economic activity. We can see that if we are measuring the independent variable 
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of election type as a dichotomy between crisis and contentment the three 
elections in 2002, 2007 and 2011 represent extreme cases. 
 
Research design 
In order to investigate whether the election context, and specifically the 
economic crisis, is a significant variable in explaining the framing of election 
coverage by media outlets we ideally want to compare a large number of 
elections in a number of countries where there is variation on this variable. 
There is a dearth of comparative research in political communication in large 
part because of the differences in coding. This means there is a lack of cross-
nationally comparative data (Norris 2009; Aalberg, Strömbäck, and de Vreese 
2012). Indeed, there is also very little in the way of comparable time-series 
within countries. However, single-country cases can make a significant 
contribution to comparative research in political communication (see for instance 
Wilke and Reinemann 2001). 
 
In this section, we analyse the Irish case in terms of the previous theoretical 
discussion. In doing so, we consider cross- and intra-case perspectives. We are 
able to demonstrate that the Irish case is a least-likely case for a policy framing 
of elections compared to many other countries. Moreover, we argue that the 2011 
election was a least-likely case for policy-focussed coverage in all but one respect, 
that of the unprecedented crisis the Irish economy, polity, and society faced.  
 
First, commercial pressures in the Irish newspaper business are very high. The Irish 
newspaper market is highly competitive. The press is small, crowded and 
unsubsidised, and Irish-based newspapers must compete with localized editions of 
British newspapers. Commercial pressure in 2011 was probably greater than at any 
other point in the newspapers’ history. Like newspapers elsewhere, Irish papers lost 
circulation, which fell by 22 percent between 2007 and 2011.  The economic crisis put 
much greater pressure on newspaper advertising revenues which fell by 56 per cent 
in the same period.5 Thus sales have come to constitute a greater share of revenue. In 
particular, the papers shared in the Irish property bust. Some of the papers had 
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become dependent on lucrative property supplements during the boom, and like 
the Irish state itself, faced a massive shortfall in revenue when the property 
market crashed. Even those papers that remained profitable were left with large 
boom-era debts. These commercial pressures should have increased their 
incentive to reduce costs and sell more papers which the literature suggests can 
be achieved by framing the election as a game. Indeed, unprecedented numbers 
of opinion polls and leaders debates on television in 2011 made it easier than 
ever for the papers to provide game-oriented coverage.  
 
The alternative hypothesis is that media fragmentation would allow newspapers 
to become more policy driven because they could target specific types of readers 
who shared a policy outlook. So the introduction of the Daily Mail and the Sun in 
Ireland might have meant these papers could have safely increased policy 
coverage that was populist in tone and right-wing in outlook. There are two 
problems with this explanation. The media fragmentation that took place did so 
before the 2007 election. Also (as we see below) the trends we observe are 
uniform across all newspapers, including those that are ideologically pluralist. 
 
Second, Ireland reflects the liberal model of media systems (Hallin and Mancini 
2004), which has a norm of impartial reporting and a rigorous distinction 
between ‘hard news’ and commentary. Papers are not now clearly associated 
with parties and seem to endeavour to contain a plurality of opinion. Indeed, 
there is very good evidence that Irish journalists do not generally express their 
political opinions through their reporting. Survey responses suggest that Irish 
journalists are much more (socially) liberal and (economically) left-wing than 
their paper’s editorial stances and indeed Irish society in general (Corcoran 
2004). We see no evidence to suggest that this variable is not constant across the 
three elections included in this study. 
 
Third, Ireland is not a consensual democracy. Lijphart places it on the border 
between consensus and majoritarianism, but Irish political scientists would 
argue that it is much closer to the Westminster model. In particular, the Irish 
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executive is very much dominant, even outdoing the British exemplar in 
government domination of the legislature (O'Malley and Martin 2010). 
Admittedly, Ireland has had coalition governments in recent decades, but power 
is not shared with the opposition. Ireland has also given a significant role for to 
interest groups, known as the ‘social partners’. The system of social partnership 
largely collapsed as a result of the economic crisis, returning much power to the 
core executive. Generally, Ireland’s institutional structure suggests a  tendency 
toward the game frame. 
 
Fourth, Ireland is known for its non-ideological politics. While social and 
ideological patterns are discernable, they are subtle and apparently ephemeral 
compared with those in other established democracies (though see Byrne and 
O'Malley 2012). Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, two pragmatic, conservative, 
nationalist parties, have dominated Irish politics since the 1920s. The small 
Irish Labour Party is one of the most centrist left-wing parties in Europe. At the 
national level, this ideological consensus makes Ireland a most likely case for 
game framing, as parties and leaders compete on valence issues. At the 
constituency level, the electoral system produces relatively candidate-centred 
competition, which focuses on the representation of local interests at the expense 
of national policy. In fact it could be argued that Ireland’s entry to the external 
funding programme in late 2010 further reduced the scope for policy debate, as 
so little remained to be decided by the Irish political system, though many 
commentators and some politicians advocated rejection or renegotiation of the 
bailout deal. An analysis of the parties’ manifestos shows no significant widening 
or contraction of the policy space (Suiter and Farrell 2011). 
 
We have argued that Ireland was a least-likely case for a policy-oriented framing 
of election coverage in 2011. The commercial pressure on newspapers, 
journalistic norms, pattern of democracy, and the nature of party competition all 
point towards a system in which elections are likely to be framed as a game. 
Moreover, these variables also point towards a more game-oriented coverage 
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than in recent Irish elections, except for professional norms which are neutral. 
Table 3 summarises these arguments.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
This brings us to the final variable, election context, or more specifically for this 
case: the economic situation. The 2011 election clearly represents an extreme 
case where the value observed in the key independent variable being tested ‘lies 
far away from the mean of a given distribution’ (Gerring 2007: 101-102). The 
systemic crisis in Ireland points towards policy framing, both in comparison to 
Ireland’s past, and previously studied elections in other countries because the 
policy choices Ireland faced seemed to matter more than ever. As such Ireland 
provides an interrupted time-series where we see a ‘treatment’ administered, 
presenting itself as a sharp change in an independent variable in one point on a 
time-series (Gerber and Green 2008). We use a series of observations on the 
policy/ game dependent variable, and see if the ‘treatment’ of the financial crisis, 
caused an interruption to the dependent variable, while other potentially 
influential variables are held constant. The advantage of having this extreme 
treatment is that it will be easier to observe the impact of the variable and make 
inferences to where the values on the variable are more moderate. Having 
outlined the research design, in the next section we describe the sources of the 
data, the coding scheme, sampling and inter-coder reliability tests. 
 
 
Data 
We coded newspaper articles from each of the official election campaigns in 2002, 
2007 and 2011. In 2002, we undertook a content analysis of four newspapers 
(Irish Times, Irish Independent, Examiner and Evening Herald), while in 2007 
five newspapers (the above plus the Irish Sun) were included. The analysis of 
2011 election includes twelve national newspapers including Sunday broadsheets 
and tabloids. Papers in Ireland tend to be internally pluralist (that is, offer space 
to a range of opinions in their comment pages) and non-ideological, though the 
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Irish Times is generally regarded as a liberal ‘paper of record’ and some of the 
local editions of the UK paper tend to be more likely to have declared policy 
positions. We coded all weekday issues throughout the short campaign, 25 April 
to 17 May in 2002, 30 April to 26 May in 2007, and all issues published from 2 
February to 25 February, 2011. All articles from the news section, comment 
pages and editorials with reference to the election, the campaign, or political 
parties, were included and coded line by line. Letters to the editor, e-mails or 
extracts from web coverage, such as ‘tweetwatch’ were excluded. The coding did 
include reviews of TV programmes on the election, including leader debates. In 
2011 a random number generator was used to select 40 per cent of the articles. 
This ensured that an even coverage of front-page and inside page articles was 
included in the sample.6 This procedure was followed for each issue in each 
newspaper.  
 
This resulted in a total of 1,217 articles from the 2002 election, 2,095 articles 
from 2007 and 1,440 articles from 2011. We used the same coding scheme in all 
three elections (see detailed codes in Appendix).; in the following we focus on 
descriptive statistics from the 2007 dataset as detailed information about the 
2002 dataset can be found in Brandenburg (2005) and details of coding of articles 
from the 2011 election can be found in McMenamin et al. (2013).  
 
There are a number of ways we can measure these frames. One is to take the 
whole article as the unit of analysis and code according to the dominant frame in 
the article (Aalberg, Strömbäck, and de Vreese 2012). However it is possible that 
a number of frames are contained in a single article (Farnsworth and Lichter 
2011), and if one were studying the effect of an article one might assume that 
longer articles should be more heavily weighted. Using just a dominant frame 
could misestimate the level of coverage of issue, strategy or game frames, if for 
instance strategy framing dominates an article but it covers certain policy issues 
as well we would incorrectly estimate 100 percent strategy coverage and no issue 
coverage. These errors might cancel one another out over a large number of 
articles such as we have, but we cannot be certain this would be the case. An 
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alternative is to code articles as whether a given frame is present or not; but this 
is an imprecise measure that loses information. We use text segments instead of 
full articles because they give a more precise and nuanced measure of the frame, 
which can be aggregated to article level for comparative purposes. For a 
discussion of the coding and reliability tests, see the Appendix (available online). 
 
 
 
Results 
There has been a steady increase in the volume of electoral coverage in Irish 
media over time (Farrell 1978; Bowman 1987). Though analysis of media 
coverage of elections before 2002 is patchy we have some data for the Irish Times 
and Irish Independent, respectively the liberal ‘newspaper of record’ and a more 
populist broadsheet (Farrell 1993, 1990). The proportion of election coverage 
framed as policy decreased from 59.2 to 30.7 percent between 1973 and 2007,  
while the level of game-framed coverage increased. This trend is consistent with 
the arguments made that there has been an ‘Americanisation’ of media across 
the world (Hallin and Mancini 2004).  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Using our data this trend is observable across all types of newspapers from 2002 
to 2007 (see Table 4). In 2007, we see a dramatic decrease in policy coverage, in 
the broadsheets as well as the tabloid for which we have comparative data. This 
may have been because 2007 was a much closer election than in 2002, which was 
seen as something of a foregone conclusion (Murphy 2003: pp. 17-18). Across all 
papers policy-framed election coverage drops by between 10 and 15 points. In 
2007 the Irish Independent carries as little policy coverage as the tabloids (as a 
proportion of each paper’s election coverage).  
 
In 2011, though all other variables point to no change or a continuing fall in 
policy coverage, our theoretical expectation is that the sharp deterioration in the 
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performance of the Irish economy will cause an increase in issue-framed 
coverage. This is what we see in dramatic fashion. The tabloids see a large rise in 
policy-framed coverage of the 2011 election – to almost 50 percent for one 
(though it should be noted that the amount of coverage tabloids devote to election 
coverage was very small (see McMenamin et al. 2013)). The increase for the 
broadsheets is even greater (by between 20 and 30 points); so most election 
coverage was policy-focussed in 2011.  
 
If the increased policy coverage in 2011 is related to the crisis then we expect 
that within the policy coverage, the subject of the crisis – the economy – would 
feature heavily. Voters clearly identify the economy as important in 2011. When 
asked the single most important issue or problem, 35.6 percent mentioned the 
economic crisis and a further 13.5 percent mentioned related economic issues, 
such as unemployment (Lansdowne/ RTÉ exit poll). The crisis had an impact on 
people’s vote choices. The proposed Taoiseach (prime minister) and the set of 
ministers were important criteria for 35 percent of voters in choosing how to vote 
in 2007. This dropped to 20 percent in 2011. Meanwhile the criterion of ‘policies 
set out by the parties’ increased from 25 percent to 43 percent over the two 
elections (Marsh and Cunningham 2011: 185). Table 5 breaks down the election 
coverage in the three elections. We observe a large increase in the coverage of the 
economy from 5.3 percent in 2007 to almost 20 percent in 2011. Two-thirds of the 
articles that make any reference to the economy in 2011 also explicitly refer to 
an economic crisis. When we make a direct comparison with just the newspapers 
coded in 2007 (final column in Table 5) we see a similar shift to policy-framed 
coverage. So this finding is not an artefact of the additional newspapers coded.  
 
Interestingly, the trend in strategic and game-framed coverage is not uniform. 
Strategy-framed coverage halves – from 40 percent to less than 20 percent – but 
the horserace coverage actually increases quite significantly. This probably 
reflects the increase in opinion polling at the election. It also shows that 
suggestions that game and strategy-framed should be separated are correct 
(Aalberg, Strömbäck, and de Vreese 2012). However this result does not 
Comment [L1]: Please add reference details 
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contradict our expectations, which relate to overall policy-framed coverage. This 
still records a huge increase in 2011. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Another issue that voters mention relates to the political system. This was 
identified as the most important issue by 36.3 percent of the electorate 
(Lansdowne/ RTÉ exit poll). This may seem surprising but there was a strong 
sense in Ireland that the political system had failed and needed to be reformed. 
This issue was given much greater prominence in the manifestos of all the main 
political parties (Suiter and Farrell 2011). This increased priority was reflected 
in newspaper coverage. The political system code rose from negligible levels in 
2007 to account for almost 12 percent of coverage in 2011. While we can see that 
the increase in policy focus by the press is reflected in the priorities of voters and 
presumably readers, our data can offer no indication as to any causal direction.  
 
Because of the very high number of observations, even substantively 
uninteresting changes in coverage shown in Table 5 are statistically highly 
significant. We therefore use a more conservative test of whether changes are 
statistically significant where we take the percentage coverage of each 
newspaper for which we have data common across the 2007 and 2011 elections 
and conduct a two-tailed, paired t-test on the differences of the mean coverage 
over these elections. This makes for a much more strenuous test of difference, yet 
we still see that the following changes between 2007 and 2011 are statistically 
significant7: Political System (p. =0.00015), Economy (p.=0.0031), Campaigning 
(p.=0.0066), Polls/ Horserace (p.=0.011), Political Ethics (p.=0.0033) and Election 
(p.=0.0087, N is 5 for all). We can also see that the differences between 2002 and 
2011 are significant; so 2007 is not an aberration.  Substantively and statistically 
there is a significant jump in policy-framed coverage for the 2011 election. The 
only independent variable pointing towards such a change is the context in 
which the election took place: economic crisis. 
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Furthermore the similarities between the newspapers in 2011 are greater than 
those similarities within the newspapers and between the crisis election and the 
2002 and 2007 ‘contentment’ elections. Table 6 reports a variety of correlations 
both within and between newspapers and years for the newspaper agendas 
across each of the 19 policy and non-policy coding categories (see online 
Appendix) in the election news coverage. We can see from the left-hand section 
that the correlations between the papers in any year are very strong and 
positive. Though the mean of the correlations between the newspapers in 2011 
(.847) is lower than for 2002 and 2007 it is a mean of a larger number and 
greater diversity of newspapers in 2011. These are much higher than the mean 
correlations of each of the papers between 2011 and the other two election years. 
The relationship between the newspapers’ election coverage in the 2002 and 
2007 contentment elections is higher (.904). We can see that the relationship 
between each paper’s coverage in 2007 and 2011 is much lower. These 
relationships show that coverage in 2011 was very different to that in the other 
elections, and the coverage in 2011 was consistent across all the newspapers.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that factors additional to the media context will be an 
important determinant of the way the media chooses to frame an election. 
Specifically we say that some elections take place in a climate of contentment 
and some in a sense of crisis. We expect the strategy/ game frame to be more 
common in ‘contentment’ elections, whereas there should be a greater emphasis 
on policy in crisis elections.  
 
Policy coverage at Irish elections from 1973 to 2007 fell continuously – consistent 
with the experience elsewhere as reported in much of the literature. Yet 2011, an 
election at a time when external bodies were required to fund the Irish state, 
saw policy coverage of the contest increase markedly. Ireland represents a least-
likely case where all other variables pointed to reduced policy coverage. The 
effect of election type was remarkable and consistent across different types of 
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newspapers. Furthermore, we observe that within the policy coverage, the press 
covers those policy areas related to the crisis. 
 
This finding is of particular interest to scholars of media and political 
communications. First it adds another, very powerful, variable to the list of 
explanatory variables used to explain media coverage of politics and in particular 
elections. The 1979 British General Election could be regarded as having taken 
place in an economic crisis, as would the 2012 Greek election. While it will often 
relate to economic performance, it should not be limited to it. There are other 
causes; a country newly in a state of war might be judged by the electorate to be 
in a state of crisis. The 2001 Israeli election that took place during the second 
Intifada is a good example. Sheafer et al. (2008) graph a spike in press coverage 
of policy issues in the 2001 election there, to mid-40s from just over 20 per cent 
in 1999. Other types of crisis can also be identified, such as the 1994 and 1996 
Italian elections that took place under the shadow of the Tangentopoli corruption 
allegations, which was a systemic crisis and saw the move from the First to 
Second Italian Republic.  
 
A second conclusion is a more general one on the nature of media coverage. This 
case shows that when it matters the media can shift focus quite dramatically and 
concentrate on policy – in Zaller’s (2003) words, they raise the ‘alarm’ and move 
to lessen dramatic and entertaining routine coverage to more focused coverage 
that alerts the otherwise ‘monitorial citizen’ whose urgent attention is required. 
In a country that had shown evidence of the hypothesised ‘dumbing down’ of 
news coverage, we observe that, in special circumstances, that trend can be 
reversed and in a dramatic fashion. Specifically the data on the 2002, 2007 and 
2011 elections in Ireland show that media focus on the election tends to follow 
predictably the context of the elections. This outcome questions the argument 
that media drives the public agenda more than real-world indicators 
(Funkhouser 1973; Dearing and Rogers 1996).  
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A third theoretical conclusion relates to the qualities of democracy. Sen (1999) 
and many others argue that democracy can prevent catastrophes because 
policies are observed and questioned earlier by a free press and other 
institutions. That the Irish press moved so firmly to cover policy in the 2011 
election might support Sen’s (1999) argument. So we could have a less 
pessimistic outlook on the press than other commentators have had: the media 
can be responsive and responsible. Unfortunately this attention came too late to 
prevent the economic collapse as, like elsewhere, the Irish media did not discuss 
or question the policies that ultimately provoked the crisis. 
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Table 1. Patterns of Democracy and type of election coverage 
Table 2: Ordinal Logit Regression of Media Framing 
Table 3: Summary of theoretical expectations and the Irish case 
Table 4: Campaign coverage of substantive policy issues, 2002-2011 
Table 5: Election coverage in 2002, 2007 and 2011, % of total coverage (point 
change since earlier election) 
Table 6: Correlations between agendas of newspapers between and within election years 
 
                                                          
1
 The use of the term framing in this context is problematic. Earlier research on this topic used 
the term schema rather than frame (Aalberg, Strömbäck, and de Vreese 2012: 166). Entman 
(1993) has given a highly cited definition of framing which is ‘to select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text’. This aspect of framing is 
consistent with the idea that an article or the text within the article might emphasise some 
aspect of the election, be it the policy debate, the horse race or the parties’ strategic 
considerations. In this regard, as McNair (2001: 38) has argued ‘journalism is an account of 
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mediated reality’ where the news article may influence the way we view the world, or that aspect 
of the world which the articles addresses. 
However the second part of Entman’s definition focuses on how this emphasis would ‘promote a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation’. It is less obvious that the emphasis on policy, game or strategy does any of 
these, though some have argued that a focus on strategy will drive cynicism in politics more than 
a focus on polls (de Vreese 2004). It might seem more appropriate to think of election news 
coverage on game, strategy or issues as agenda setting or priming, where the reader or viewer 
does not have their attitudes manipulated by the way information is presented (as one sees in the 
famous (Kahneman and Tversky (1984) experiments), but rather certain issues or factors are 
more prominent and therefore more likely to be used to evaluate parties or candidates. Because 
‘framing’ is widely accepted in this context we continue to use the term. 
 
2
 The mixed evaluation of Bulgaria receives further support from the work of Dimitrova and 
Kostadinova (2013: 82) who, in a study of elections from 1990 to 2009, report a mean 
proportion of game framing of 0.53, with a large standard deviation of 0.36. 
3
 Consensual regimes score below the mean on Lijphart’s executive-parties dimension. We coded South Africa 
as relatively majoritarian and Bulgaria as relatively consensual.  Bulgaria has a multi-party system; has usually 
had coalition governments; governments have been relatively short-lived, including caretaker cabinets; most 
seats are filled by proportional representation; and the interest group system is weak.  Democratic South 
Africa has been dominated by one party; has had single-party, dominant governments; the electoral system is 
proportional; and the interest group system has corporatist aspirations but is quite fragmented.  Brazil and 
Mexico are presidential regimes.  The concentration of executive power in a single person justifies a relatively 
majoritarian coding on the executives-parties dimension. 
 
4
 One might argue that the type of election variable and policy space variable are correlated. The 
policy space might normally widen in a crisis. If the status quo is unsustainable, political actors, 
the media, and election debates are forced to imagine new alternatives, question their own 
previous assumptions, and consider major choices. However, crises can also narrow policy 
options. For instance in the case of a military invasion or attack, events may remove other policy 
options as acceptable courses of action. 
 
5
 Calculated from Audit Bureau of Circulation 2008 - 2011 and the advertising figures are 
IAPI Adspend/Nielsen Media Research 2008 – 2011. 
6 For the Irish Independent, the proportion of articles sampled and coded was 30 per cent and 
these were then weighted up. As this is among the largest of the papers in terms of length, 
this sample was sufficient to make reasonable comparisons with the other papers. 
7
 The means on which these differences are calculated are different to those in Table 5 as they 
are based on an average of the percentage coverage in at most five newspapers, which treats 
each newspaper equally. Table 5 is based on the coverage by article and as such gives more 
weight to those papers that are published daily and those that provide greater election 
coverage. As such we can be sure our results are not an artefact of unusual patterns in one or 
two newspapers. The patterns are similar to those seen in Table 5. 
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Table 1. Patterns of Democracy and type of election coverage 
Majoritarian  
US Game 
Australia Game 
Brazil Game 
UK Game 
Canada Game 
France Game 
Greece Game 
Mexico Game 
South Africa Game 
Spain Mixed 
Consensual  
Sweden Mixed 
Bulgaria Mixed 
Germany Game 
Israel Mixed 
Japan Mixed 
Netherlands Policy 
Poland Game 
Sources: (Lijphart 1999; McMenamin 2004; Kaid and Strömbäck 2008)  
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Table 2: Ordinal Logit Regression of Media Framing 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Majoritarian 
 
3.15* 
(1.34) 
2.55† 
(1.37) 
Cut 1 
 
-1.86 
(1.08) 
-1.71 
(1.1) 
Cut 2 
 
0.95 
(0.84) 
0.74 
(0.86) 
Likelihood Ratio Chi
2
 7.45** 4.22* 
Pseudo R
2
 0.27 0.19 
  † significant at 0.1, * significant at 0.05, ** significant at 0.01 
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Table 3: Summary of theoretical expectations and the Irish case 
Media variables Hypothesised 
effect 
Irish value Prediction 
Commercial pressure Game Intense commercial 
pressure; more 
spending on opinion 
polls 
Game; cross- and 
intra-nationally 
Norms against 
partisan bias 
Game Strong non-partisan 
norms 
Game; cross-
nationally 
Political variables    
Majoritarian 
democracy 
Game Majoritarian Game; cross- and 
intra-nationally 
Narrow policy space Game Very narrow in terms 
of party system; 
extremely narrow 
because of bailout. 
Game; cross- and 
intra-nationally 
Election-type Policy Unprecedented crisis Policy; cross- and 
intra-nationally 
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Table 4: Campaign coverage of substantive policy issues, 2002-2011 
Year Irish 
Times 
Irish 
Independent 
Tabloid Examiner 
2002 
 
43.8 40.9 32.8 
Herald 
44.4 
2007 
 
30.7 24.3 21.6 
Herald 
24.0 
Irish Sun 
24.6 
Daily Star 
32.7 
2011 
 
57.4 51.7 48.9 
Irish Sun 
42.7 
Daily Star 
53.5 
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Table 5: Election coverage in 2002, 2007 and 2011, % of total coverage (point 
change since earlier election) 
 2002 2007 2011 (all) 2011 
Political System 
 
2.7 0.9      (-1.8) 11.9    (+11) 
 
11.3 
Justice 
 
4.0 1.8      (-2.2) 1.3      (-0.5) 1.3 
Economy 
 
8.5 5.3      (-3.2) 19.8  (+14.5)  21.2 
Social Welfare 
 
9.6 5.6      (-4.0) 5.0      (-0.6) 5.7 
Other Policy 
 
7.7 6.7      (-1.0) 7.6      (+0.9) 8.2 
Country specific: 
Ireland 
0.3 1.0      (+0.7) 1.2      (+0.2) 1.1 
Campaigning 
 
37.0 40.4    (+3.4) 18.9   (-21.5)  19.1 
Polls/ Horserace 
 
16.0 10.0    (-6.0) 21.6  (+11.6) 
 
20.4 
Leadership 
 
2.2 5.3      (+3.1) 5.9      (+0.6) 4.3 
Political Ethics 
 
4.0 8.4      (+4.4) 2.6      (-5.8) 2.9 
Non-political 
 
0.6 0.2      (-0.4) 0.7      (+0.5) 0.5 
Election 
 
7.5 14.4    (+6.9) 3.0      (-11.4) 3.7 
Number of articles 
 
1,217 2,095 1,440 976 
Number of 
newspapers (N) 
4 5 12 5 
The three most common types of coverage (biggest changes) are in bold.  
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Table 6: Correlations between agendas of newspapers between and within election years 
Between papers  (within years) Between papers and years 
2002 2007 2011  2007 2011 
.926 
(3) 
.895 
(10) 
.874 
(45) 
2002 .904 
(9) 
.647 
(9) 
 
 
2007 - .365 
(25) 
Cells report mean correlation coefficient based on (N) pairwise correlations, so cell (2007) reports 
the correlations of the five available papers’ correlations with each other in 2007; we obviously 
exclude correlations of the same paper within a year. For inter-year correlations on the right, 
these are based on pairwise correlations where we have the same newspapers available in both 
years. 
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Appendix: Coding and Codes 
Coding  
In 2002 and 2007 the unit of measurement is text segments within articles, measured in the 
amount of space it takes up. An individual text segment, of varying length, is defined by 
having a unique value on each of these variables. As soon as a different issue or party is 
introduced, a new text segment begins. In 2011 text segments were again used, but because 
manyuch of the articles now came from electronic formats they are measured in terms of 
‘quasi-sentences’ (see Budge et al. 2001 for a detailed description). The quasi-sentence is 
defined as an argument. A single sentence can be broken down to the number of 
arguments, each coded as a single unit. Because coders will not necessarily agree on the 
number of units in an article this might affect our results. We tested to see if the two coders 
differed in the number of codes used, but there was no significant difference. In any case, as 
we analyse the proportion of coverage, not the raw number of units, we do not consider 
that this would bias our results. Because the unit of observation in 2002 and 2007 is of 
variable length, whereas in 2011 it is of a (reasonably) standardised length, we weight the 
2002 and 2007 data by the size of the text. 
 
We measured inter-coder reliability in a number of ways. For the 2007 data we randomly 
selected five articles from each newspaper for re-coding. This provided us with 919 units 
(text segments) for reliability testing. Using Krippendorff’s alpha, regarded as a conservative 
measure for inter-coder reliability (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2002: 600) we find 
that for game-oriented codes levels of agreement are highest at .95 and .94 respectively, 
while for issue codes (see Appendix One), agreements are somewhat lower at .78 and .82 
respectively. This is not surprising because of the larger range of values on those variables, 
but these findings compare well with other studies and fall into what would be considered 
by Krippendorff (1980) and Riffe, Lacy, and Fico (1998) as good quality data. In 2011 because 
the unit of analysis for our two coders was the quasi-sentence rather than the whole article, 
we sampled 26 articles to give us up to 501 units (quasi-sentences). For the 2011 sample the 
Krippendorf’’s alpha was .93 (treating the data as ratio) when we tested it at the 10 level for 
each code (see appendix). When we treat the whole article as the unit of analysis and just 
Comment [L1]: Please add reference 
Comment [L2]: Please add reference 
Comment [L3]: Please add references 
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test for the coders’ ability to distinguish between game-framed and policy-framed articles, 
there was perfect agreement, though with a much smaller n (26). 
 
Codes 
10 – Political System  
 
20 – Justice  
Crime/Law Enforcement – references to the gardai (police) as institutions or their 
activities 
Penal System – e.g. state of prisons or broader system 
Courts – Judiciary – appointment of judges, judge pay cuts etc. 
 
30 – Defence – incl. military spending, terrorism and intelligence 
 
40 – Economy  
Economic Crisis 
Political System (general) – References to the democratic system and its 
workings/implication (e.g. placing power in the hands of people/citizens). Also refers 
to indirect references to democracy such as “This is not a dictatorship”. DOES NOT 
refer to direct references to Dail, Seanad or the Electoral System 
Clientelism/Localism (as a subject) – only code for references to clientealism or 
localism as an abstract concept/institutional problem. Do not code mere incidences of 
clientaelism (which belong under “locality-specific issue”) which do not make 
reference to the broader concept of clientelism. 
Gender/Women in politics 
Political Institutions – Factual description of the workings of the Dáil or Seanad or to 
the reform of Dáil or Seanad, including references to the power of independents to 
influence Dáil decisions 
Government Control 
Participation – code references to public participation in politics outside mere voting 
(public fora, protests, etc.). Also refers to exhortations to public to use their vote 
(rather than vote for a particular party.) 
Constitutional Rights – code references to calls to changes for referenda (e.g. on rights 
of children) 
Public Administration – Working of and reform of civil/public service and other state 
bodies. 
Croke Park Agreement – explicit references only 
 
Electoral System – Description  of the workings of the electoral systems and discussion 
of alternatives to PR-STV (list system, first-past-the-post etc.)/reform of that system. 
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Banking Crisis – Regulation of banks/ Capitalisation of Banks 
Debt Crisis (/Bailout/IMF/ECB) 
Euro currency crisis 
Public Finances (includes references to spending cuts other than pay cuts/ cuts in 
public services) 
Tax – generic reference to tax where personal/corporate distinction unclear (e.g. DIRT, 
VAT, Excise Duties) 
Labour/ Unemployment 
Emigration 
Personal Tax – income tax, PRSI, universal social  
Pay Cuts 
Industry and Commerce – Ease of doing business in Ireland; trade policy –goods and 
services e.g. education  
Corporation Tax 
Economic Development  
Housing Market – collapse of, measures to revive (inc. stamp duty changes, 1st time 
buyers grant, Section 23 Mortgage Interest Relief, 2nd home property tax, non-
primary residence). 
 
50 – Agriculture 
Agriculture (general) 
Consumer Affairs – Rip-off Ireland 
 
60 – Social Welfare  
Social Welfare (general) 
Health 
Pensions 
Social Justice – Reference to impact of cuts on the weakest in society 
Housing – Specifically references to Social Housing as opposed to the broader housing 
market  
Immigration 
Social Services/ Others 
 
70 – Education  
Education (general) 
Equal Opportunities 
Education Spending – state funding of private schools 
Religious control of patronage 
 
80 – Arts/Culture – incl. arts spending 
Arts/Culture (general) 
Page 35 of 37
Cambridge University Press
The European Political Science Review
Arts/Culture Spending 
Sport 
 
90 – Infrastructure/Technology – incl. transport, regional development, science, broadband 
availability 
Infrastructure/Technology (general) – references to Information Society, Information 
Economy, Smart Economy, Knowledge economy, broadband development. 
Transport – roads, rail infrastructures, airports, public transport.  
Regional Development - decentralisation 
Housing 
Science and Ethics – genetically modified organisms, stem cell research, cloning. 
 
100 – Environment  
Environment (general) 
Waste 
Energy 
 
110 – Foreign Affairs  
Foreign Affairs (general) 
EU 
International Involvement  
Iraq war, war on terror, other conflicts 
 
120 – Country specific: Ireland 
Northern Ireland 
Traditional Values – gay marriage, abortion, divorce 
 
130 – Campaigning  
Campaigning (general) 
Campaign Activities – On the trail colour pieces/campaign diary/following the 
candidates at particular events. 
Stunts/Gaffes -  
Campaign Strategy - references to party strategy at national and constituency level 
Nonpartisan 
Campaigning on policy – i.e. references to importance of policy in elections without 
actually explaining what that policy is e.g. “our jobs strategy”.  
Media coverage – reference to media coverage of the campaign 
Party Structure - references to party organisation/structures during and after the 
election. 
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Campaign finance – includes corporate donations, party spending 
 
140 – Polls/Horserace  
Horserace (general) – references to party/candidate being ahead/behind/in 
trouble/characterised as losing/winning a battle, race, contest, game, competition. 
Opinion Polls –including speculation on who gets elected (but not on the likely 
composition of the next Dáil.) 
Candidate selection 
Leaders Debates (specifically TV debates, including debating tactics/strategy) 
Likely composition/organisation/working of next government – often in context of poll 
results – refers to party composition rather than individual ministers. 
Vote Maximisation – references to at national and constituency level 
 
150 – Leadership – references to competence and performance of leaders 
Leadership/ Competence/ Performance including questions of leadership abilities. This 
includes candidates offering  their assessments (presumably generally negative) oif weach 
other. Examples where candidates criticise an opponent’s policy position should be coded in 
two units: as 151 and according to the policy area. 
 
160 – Political Ethics  
Political Ethics (general) 
Corruption/ Sleaze (references or allusions to corruption/scandal/affairs/relationships)  
Negative Campaigning - represented as opposition to a policy position of another 
without offering policy ideas of their own. 
 
170 – Non-political – references that are not political but contained in articles on the 
election 
180 – Election – incl. turnout, exhortations to vote, descriptions of how voting system 
works, objective information, such as lists of candidates 
190 – Locality-specific issue  
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